

# Egypt Since the Revolution

Craig Charney




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This is IPI's third poll in post-revolutionary Egypt.

We aimed to understand voters' concerns as the parliamentary elections approach, gauge their perceptions of potential presidential candidates and parties, and understand their views on Egypt's economic and foreign policies.

For this poll, Charney Research interviewed a random national sample of 800 Egyptian adults in Arabic using trained local interviewers between August 8 and 15. The error margin for the survey is 3.5%.

The results are compared with IPI's Egyptian surveys in March and June of this year, as well as a 2009 Pew survey and a 2008 Charney survey. We also draw on the August and September DEDI/AI Ahram vote tracking polls.



Egyptians are still hopeful about the country's direction, but much less so than immediately after the revolution after serious economic deterioration.

50% remain positive, against 42% negative, a 32-point drop in optimism since our March poll. Still, our results are far more positive than in the 2008 Charney' poll, when only 27% were hopeful.

Economic concerns, consistently seen as the biggest problem, have risen sharply since the revolution, with almost two-thirds (62%) citing it now, compared to just one in three (35%) in March.

Demonstrations (15%), security and crime at 11% (up from 5%), and corruption (6%) are also top of mind.


Few now express concern over the birth of Egyptian democracy.

While the country's mood is still positive, it's more anxious, as the general public grows concerned about the economy and basic order and safety.

## Egyptians say their family finances and personal safety are worse now than under Mubarak.

How would you describe your household's financial situation: excellent, good, fair or poor?

How often do you fear for your own personal safety or for that of your family these days?



Q. 6,7; Charney 2008

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Egyptians now say they were worse off financially and less secure than under former president Hosni Mubarak.

More than eight in ten (82%) Egyptians say their household's financial status is fair or poor – worse than in 2008, when seven in ten (69%) did.


They are likeliest to be less educated, particularly women, as well as from the Central Nile Delta.

Three-fourths (75%) are concerned for their personal safety, with a 20-point jump since 2008 in the proportion who say they are often fearful.

While the fall of the Mubarak regime has opened up political freedoms, there has been a price in financial and physical security.

## Most Egyptians have lost patience with the ongoing protests.

Thinking about the ongoing protest in Egypt, do you think these are: necessary actions to achieve the goals of the revolution OR unnecessary disruptions when Egypt



Q. 8

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
Impatience is widespread with the continuing protests.

Over half (53%) of Egyptians call the protests unnecessary disruptions, just over one-third (35%) say they are necessary to advance the revolution.

The Egyptians most fed up with the protests include people in mid-sized cities, the Suez Canal Zone and Alexandria; new voters and secular party supporters, and those who want closer ties with the West or oppose extremist movements.

Protest supporters include younger women, residents of Fayoum, and religious party supporters, as well as people with anti-Israeli or anti-Western attitudes.

Amid the economic crisis gripping the country, the moderate majority of Egyptians wants the protests and disruptions plaguing their country to stop.




Egyptians displeasure with the national government has jumped to levels seen under Mubarak while Prime Minister Sharaf's favorability has plunged.

Almost three-fourths (73%) give the government a fair or poor rating. This is a massive reversal from March, soon after the revolution, when four in five (79%) rated it positively, and as bad as ratings of Mubarak's government in 2008.

In line with the change in perceptions of government, Prime Minister Essam Sharaf's favorability rating has dropped by more than half, to just 35% from 74% in June and 62% in March.

However, this shift has not been accompanied by a rejection of the ruling military: Defense Minister Mohammed Tantawi, head of the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, remains quite popular with more than three-fifths (63%) favorable, unchanged from June.

The afterglow of the revolution is fading – Egyptians are now as unhappy with their government's performance as in the Mubarak era, although they still view their military rulers favorably.



Amr Moussa still holds a sizable lead for the Presidency, followed well behind by Essam Sharaf and Mohammed Tantawi, though vote shares for all candidates are down slightly.


Moussa, former head of the Arab League, holds on as the frontrunner for President with 28% of the votes – more than double his closest competitor, Prime Minister Sharaf (12%), and four times that of Defense Minister Tantawi (7%)

Moussa's vote share has declined from 32% in June to 28% in August. Sharaf's has shrank from 16% in June to 12% in August. Tantawi's vote share, if he runs, has slipped from 8% in June to 7% in August.

Among the other presidential candidates shown, Bastawisi, Nour and Sabahi capture 3% each, 2% goes to former IAEA director El-Baradei, and 1% to Hatata. Aside from Nour, leader of the El Ghad party, and El-Baradei, these second-tier candidates are largely unknown to Egyptians.

Thus, Moussa still maintains a solid lead over second and third place candidates Sharaf and Tanatawi. Bastawisi, Nour, El Baradei and Hatata trail far behind.

## Wafd and MB parties only ones known by majority; most new parties little known, while Salifis unpopular.



•With so many new arrivals on the political scene, Egyptians are not familiar with most of the parties running for parliament, as we see in this slide from our June poll.

•On the left we see that among the established parties previously in the People's Assembly, the Wafd and the Muslim Brotherhood are the only ones known by a majority.

•The Wafd is the most popular, with 40% favorable, 19% unfavorable

• The MB is polarizing, three in ten favorable, an equal number not, two-fifths unsure. The latter group, the unsure, is the key to the election: will they move to the MB or away from it?

•The Nasserists have 24% favorable, the NDP's replacement party 20% favorable, 20% not (much lower negatives than the NDP's).


•Al Ghad , Tagammu , and Umma all have favorabilities in the teens but net negative images.

•On the right, we have the new parties. They are generally unknown public, with three-fourths or more unable to give opinions.

•Only one new party had made much impact on public opinion; it's the Salifist Nour party, disliked by 30% and liked by only 12%

•The Egyptian public has not had time to get to know all the new parties clamoring for its attention.

## MB surge has tied religious, secular blocs, but undecideds hold key to Parliament vote.



CR March, Jun 11; DED/Al  
Ahram August, Sept 2011


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- We see here how the vote for parliament has evolved since our first poll in March.
- Then, when only established parties were in the running, the Wafd was the most popular and secularists led religious parties, 35% to 20%.
- In June, as new parties entered, the Islamist vote held at 19%, while the secular vote fell back to 26%, with a sharp drop in the Wafd vote. Don't knows climbed 14 points to 49%
- In August, as more parties and coalitions came on the scene, undecideds climbed further, to 57%, very unusual as an election approaches – voters normally make up their minds. The secular/religious balance was similar to June.
- Last month, people began making their choices, and the undecideds fell back to 38%. The MB party consolidated the religious vote, surging to 24%, while the Salafis held their 4% and other Islamists had 1%. The Wafd was still at 12%, the Free Egyptians of Christian billionaire Naguib Sawiris had 4%, and several other secular parties totalled 15%.
- With this, the secular and religious blocs were at parity, 31% to 29%, with the undecideds holding the balance.

## Amid economic trouble, Egyptians want state help.

*Which would you prefer for Egypt's economy: to create jobs through free markets, foreign investment and more help to the poor OR to protect jobs through state control, reversing privatization and maintaining current subsidies?*



Q. 30

with Charney Research

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
As the economic situation has darkened, Egyptians have grown anxious and are looking for help from the state.

Three-quarters (76%) preferred protecting jobs through state control, reversing privatization and subsidies, while under one quarter (22%) favored job creation through free markets, foreign trade and investment, and aid to the poor. This runs counter to the findings of our poll in March, when two-thirds said they would prefer political parties that favored economic development through international trade and investment to ones favoring protecting jobs through state control.

Egyptians who prefer state control are disproportionately represented among those who support religious parties or want to reduce Egypt's ties with the West.

Free market supporters tend to want closer ties with the West, and think that Western countries and rising powers like India and China should be Egypt's most important economic partners.

Egypt's faltering economy has pushed the public to seek out any port in a storm, and in this case it is the state.




Despite the turn away from markets, the desire for foreign economic help has grown.

Most Egyptians still want closer connections with the West to develop their economy. However, they also think that their wealthy Arab neighbors should be the country's most important economic partner.

Three in five (60%) favor closer connections with the developed West in order to help solve Egypt's problems, up from two in five (43%) in 2008. Just over one-quarter (27%) favors reducing connections with the West, down from half (49%) in 2008. Those who would reduce connections include urban youth and people with strong anti-Israeli sentiments ( Hamas supporters and those who favor breaking the peace treaty).

However, almost three in five (57%) think that the wealthy Arab states should be Egypt's most important economic partner, while one in five (20%) prefer rising economic powers like China and India and just one in six (16%) the West.

So, it appears that Egyptians want economic help from all sides – the state, the West, and their wealthy Arab neighbors.



A large majority of Egyptians wants to keep Egypt's peace treaty with Israel.

Seven in ten (71%) prefer maintaining the treaty, including diplomatic ties and the state of peace. Strongest support comes from small to medium sized cities and the Suez Canal Zone, are secular voters or government supporters, and favor closer ties with the West.


One quarter (24%) favor breaking the treaty, ending relations, and returning to a state of war. One in three (10% of total) would maintain it if a two-state solution were reached. Opponents of the treaty come disproportionately from Fayoum and those who favor reducing ties with the West or Hamas and Hezbollah.

These findings came before Egyptian police were killed during the Israeli military response to a Palestinian attack near the Israeli city of Eilat and demonstrators subsequently stormed the Israeli Embassy in Cairo. However, given the sizable majorities in favor of the treaty, opposed to continued protests in Egypt, and hostile to militant anti-Israel groups, those events are unlikely to have changed these figures much.

Despite the uneasy relationship between Egypt and Israel since the revolution, most Egyptians want to keep the three decade peace between the two countries.

## The majority would cancel Egypt's agreement to sell natural gas to Israel.

Do you think Egypt should cancel its agreement to sell natural gas to Israel, renegotiate it for better



Q. 34

with Chanley Research

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More than half the Egyptians are unhappy with the agreement to sell natural gas to Israel and would see it cancelled.

A majority (56%) would cancel the agreement, mired in allegations of corruption, crony capitalism and below-market pricing. Support for cancellation is highest among younger women, self-identified conservatives voters, Israel treaty opponents and Hamas supporters.


One third favor (36%) renegotiating the deal for better terms, a view most common among older, urban, educated men; Alexandria residents, and those who favor economic ties with rising powers like India and China.

Very few (4%) favors maintaining the status quo. Still, it is worth noting that 40% would retain the agreement in some form.


While most Egyptians are concerned with the economy and want to preserve the peace with Israel. But a majority would rather cancel this sale, whether from anger over a bad or corrupt deal or from hostility to Israel itself.

# Both Barack Obama and Mahmoud Ahmedinejad remain unpopular in post-revolutionary Egypt.

Obama Favorability




Mahmoud Ahmedinejad Favorability



O. 18, 20, Charney 2008, Greenburg 2009

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Egyptians are quite hostile to Arab leaders who are considered rejectionists of peace or pro-Iranian.

They are unfavorable towards to Syrian president Bashar al-Assad , who has touted his closeness to Iran and resistance to Israel, by a massive seven to one margin (58% unfavorable to 8% favorable). The Syrian president has been engaged in repressing pro-democracy demonstrations since March. His small support tends to come from the poorly educated, the very conservative, and those who support Hezbollah and Hamas.

Hezbollah, another Iranian ally, is rejected by almost two to one (36% to 20%) This is a u-turn from 2008, when Egyptians favored Hezbollah by a similar margin as the movement basked in the afterglow of its 2006 war with Israel.


Egyptians also are now hostile to the militant Hamas movement in Palestine by three to two (36% unfavorable to 24% favorable), while in 2009 they were favorable by a five to four margin (52% favorable to 44% unfavorable).

Like Assad supporters, many current Hezbollah and Hamas supporters tend to have less than a high school education and identify as very conservative.

Support for Hamas and Hezbollah in Egypt has waned in recent years, and Assad has very few friends there indeed.

# Osama bin Laden had far more appeal to Egypt's public than his successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri.

June 2011



Q. 19, Charney 2008, Pew

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## Summary

- Egypt's optimism wanes as worry grows on economy, security, and stability.
- Egyptians say their family finances and personal safety are worse than under Mubarak and have lost patience with ongoing protests.
- Discontent with the national government is up sharply and Prime Minister Essam Sharaf's favorability has plummeted.
- Amr Moussa still tops possible presidential contenders; Sharaf is next.
- MB and Wafd are most popular parties, but MB has consolidated religious vote while secular vote fragmented among new, old parties
- MB leads among parties, while secular and religious blocs now tied. Undecideds are key to the majority in the next parliament.
- In economic trouble, Egyptians want state help, but also seek closer ties to the West and economic partnership with wealthy Arab states.
- Continued strong support for Egypt's peace treaty with Israel.
- Majority would cancel Israel natural gas deal, but large minority backs it.
- President Obama's popularity is low and declining in Egypt.
- Strong hostility to Ahmedinejad and Iranian allies Assad, Hezbollah, and Hamas, along with rejection of Al Zawahiri.

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# Methodology

- We conducted 800 face-to-face interviews in Egypt between August 8 and 15, 2011.
- Respondents were a representative random sample of the Egyptian adult population. The results are weighted to match Egypt's demographics.
- The margin of error was +/- 3.5%.
- Egypt was divided into six regions (Greater Cairo, Suez Canal, Central Nile Delta, Fayoum, South/ Upper Egypt and Costal) to permit regional analysis.
- The interviewing was carried out by the Egyptian Research and Training Center (ERTC).
- The survey was managed by Benjamin Novak and this report was written by Craig Charney and Benjamin Novak.
- Earlier Charney surveys in Egypt were conducted in March, June, and August 2011 and September 2008.