November 2, 2001
States of Disgrace
by Craig Charney
Although America's struggle against terror has begun with action
against Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda and the Afghan regime sheltering him,
it cannot end there. A number of Muslim states are involved with terrorism
in various ways. If we do nothing about them, then even if bin Laden and his
organization are neutralized, their tentacles will re-emerge, attached to
some other name — and beard.
Three different kinds of states have ties to fundamentalist terror: failed
states, rogue states and fragile states. Each of these “states of disgrace”
demands an appropriate response.
Failed states are ruined countries that are breeding grounds for noxious bodies
like al Qaeda. Their governments collapsed after catastrophic civil wars,
leaving regimes with only nominal control of much of the territory (Afghanistan,
Sudan) or a “stateless society” (Somalia). Their lack of effective
authority gives free reign to groups like bin Laden's to hatch their deadly
plots, while his troops and wealth have made him a valued ally for those who
rule these desperate, violent places.
Even President Bush, despite his declared allergy to “nation-building,”
recognizes that our role in Afghanistan will not end with military victory
there. The other failed states also need rehabilitation, even if by non-military
means. The persistent chaos in Afghanistan, Sudan and Somalia and the ease
with which bin Laden has operated in those countries are why these black holes
of anarchy and misery cannot be allowed to persist.
To reconstitute the failed states, a degree of law and order must be re-established,
along with the rudiments of an economy and the beginnings of inclusive institutions.
Given the long-term commitment required, it would be wise to share the burden
of transition via U.N. administration, as was done in Cambodia and Namibia.
This would also allow substantial Muslim participation, pre-empting charges
of an American or “infidel” occupation.
Rogue states are functioning states in cahoots with terror groups, such as
Iraq and Libya. The problem of Iraq has new urgency, since only it and Russia
have stocks of the purified, finely ground germs found on the letters used
in some anthrax attacks. Previous intelligence reports indicated that Iraq
had trained bin Laden's men in biological and chemical warfare.
These states must be isolated and confronted. This may occur through air or
ground attack, covert action or coups, commando raids to snatch persons accused
of crimes, aiding internal opponents or political and economic pressure. Such
measures curtailed Libya’s support for terror and forced its handover
of the Lockerbie bombing suspects for trial.
But the confrontations must be in ways and at times of our choosing, so that
we do not shatter the alliance with other, fragile Muslim states needed for
military action in Afghanistan.
Fragile states are those whose governments are formally anti-terror but where
powerful elements in state and society support it. In Pakistan and Egypt,
repressive secular regimes made Islam into the only outlet for dissent and
placated its militants with growing sway over education and law, reaping powerful
fundamentalist movements that indoctrinate and intimidate government and society
alike. Islamic militants seek the same end in traditionally tolerant Indonesia,
shaken recently by sectarian conflict.
Iran’s reform-minded president and public have waged an unequal struggle
with entrenched fundamentalists in government and intelligence agencies. Saudi
Arabia poses the most difficult challenge, since its corrupt, rich monarchy
plays both sides, offering verbal and logistical backing for the United States
while hampering criminal investigations of bin Laden and helping fund his
organization
In the short run, we must find ways to oblige these states to ratchet up pressure
on terror and its supporters, without upsetting their delicate equilibrium
and swinging them into the fundamentalist camp. In the medium to long run
we need to shore up Islamic moderates and strengthen their judicial and political
systems. A major part of this involves strengthening democratic civil society,
particularly helping non-extremist Islamic voices to be heard in public, and
improving the status of women, a key anti-fundamentalist constituency.
Thus, while resolute, well-targeted military action will be a vital part of
defeating terror, it will require more than quick hammer blows against headline-making
individuals and groups. Action against terrorism in Afghanistan and beyond
challenges us to rethink our foreign policy priorities to cope with the complexities
of the many states involved.
The issue is not “realism” versus “idealism.” It is to
formulate a grand strategy that combines appropriate use of force with constructive
efforts to create an international environment where terror cannot flourish.
Craig Charney is a political scientist and consultant who has studied democratization in the Third World and worked in Central Asia and the Middle East.
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